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Although inflation-linked bonds have many advantages, nominal bonds are
the most important instrument to finance public debts throughout the world.
One explanation that the literature has offered is that nominal bonds make
countercyclical monetary policies more effective. This paper reconsiders this
argument with a model that features an inflation risk premium in the nom-
inal bonds interest rate. In this model, nominal bonds help to stabilize the
economy, but also add to debt service costs. The paper finds that the debt
service costs channel is very powerful: in the case of discretionary policy-
making, inflation-linked bonds always outperform nominal bonds. The case
of commitment qualifies this result. Still, also commitment cannot explain
the occurrence of large stocks of nominal bonds alongside small stocks of
inflation-linked bonds.
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1 Introduction
Inflation-linked bonds are becoming increasingly popular. Since the UK and
the US launched inflation-linked bonds in 1981 and 1997 respectively, more
and more countries have started issuing inflation-indexed bonds, among
which are countries as Germany, France, Italy and Spain. In addition, the
amounts outstanding are increasing. The universal market for inflation-
linked bonds has grown from below $500 billion at the start of the century
to more than $3.000 billion in 2016 (PIMCO, 2020).
Yet, even today the majority of public debt is financed through nominal
bonds. Westerhout and Ciocyte (2017) report that the fraction of the public
debt that is financed with inflation-linked bonds is sizeable in the UK, 28
percent, but much smaller in other countries: 14 percent in France, 11
percent in the US and 10 percent in Italy. Furthermore, the number of
countries that do not issue inflation-indexed bonds at all is still pretty large.
This picture points to a puzzle that has been recognized for a long time
but still has not been solved: why are nominal bonds rather than inflation-
linked bonds the major type of debt? For there are several factors that call
for using inflation-linked debt. A fundamental argument is that inflation-
linked bonds generate real returns that, unlike those of nominal bonds, do
not vary with inflation.1 This should make inflation-linked bonds more at-
tractive to both their holders and their issuers. Furthermore, due to the
protection of investors from inflation risk, the interest rate on inflation-
linked bonds may be below that on nominal bonds, allowing governments
in turn to reduce their average debt service costs (Fischer, 1975; Campbell
and Shiller, 1996; Campbell and Viceira, 2001). Using tax smoothing as
objective, optimal debt management calls for the use of long-term inflation-
linked bonds (Barro, 2003). As stressed in the time consistency literature,
inflation-linked bonds hold the promise of lower inflation and lower associ-
ated welfare costs (Calvo, 1978; Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Barro and Gordon,
1983a, 1983b). Inflation-linked bonds can also be used to derive inflation ex-
pectations, which is helpful for the conduct of monetary policies (Campbell
et al., 2009).
A disadvantage of inflation-linked bonds is that their markets may be
1In practice, nominal returns do not vary 1-to-1 with inflation. Payments are often
linked to lagged inflation rates. In the case of the UK, these are the inflation rates from
3 to 8 months before (UK Debt Management Office, 2020). Next, many ILB-issuing
countries offer deflation floors at maturity (PIMCO, 2020). Further, the price index that
is relevant for some investor will generallly not coincide perfectly with the price index used
for indexing the inflation-linked bond.
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less liquid than those of nominal bonds (Campbell et al., 2009; Gürkaynak
et al., 2010; Fleckenstein et al., 2014). This relative lack of liquidity has
been found to be particularly important when the bonds are introduced
and in times of financial distress such as in 2008 (Campbell et al., 2009).
Furthermore, as shown by Bohn (1988) and Calvo and Guidotti (1990),
nominal bonds allow the government to hedge against shocks to its budget
if adverse shocks to the government budget correlate with an increase in
inflation. Hence, nominal debt can reduce the variability of distortionary
tax rates across states of nature. Further, part of government spending may
be nominal due to nominal contracts, such as wage contracts. This may
offer a third reason to finance the public debt partly with nominal bonds.
This paper asks whether the dominance of nominal bonds can be ex-
plained from their attractive stabilization properties. Therefore, I construct
a model in the spirit of the Barro-Gordon model of discretionary monetary
policies (Barro and Gordon, 1983a; 1983b; Rogoff, 1985; Alesina and Grilli,
1992; Walsh, 1995) and add to this a portfolio decision. In this model, like in
the Barro-Gordon model, monetary policies stabilize the economy and im-
ply an inflation bias. However, my model adopts a different mechanism in
linking surprise inflation to an expansion of the economy. This mechanism
relies fully on nominal bonds, thereby giving maximum potential for nomi-
nal bonds to stabilize the economy. In addition and similar to Walsh (1995),
the model allows the central banker to be imperfectly informed about the
supply shocks she wants to fight.
In the model, households decide on the shares of nominal bonds and
inflation-linked bonds in their portfolios before an output shock has mate-
rialized and monetary policies are carried out. As will be shown below, the
monetary policies in this model imply that consumption and inflation are
negatively correlated. Hence, households command a positive inflation risk
premium on nominal bonds in order to compensate for their unattractive
hedging properties. This risk premium will turn out to be crucial for the
main results in this paper and is a major difference with a large literature
that assumes risk neutrality (see Bohn (1988, 1990) and Calvo and Guidotti
(1990, 1993)).
In order to understand what drives the optimal financing structure of the
public debt, this paper distinguishes between the direct effects of nominal
debt upon household welfare and the indirect effects, i,e. effects that run
through debt service costs. The direct effects are quite intuitive and similar
to those obtained by Calvo and Guidotti (1990). For a sufficiently high
output gap (a sufficiently low variance of supply shocks), optimal public
debt policies use only inflation-indexed bonds, whereas in the case of a
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lower output gap (higher variance), the optimal amount of nominal debt is
strictly positive, decreasing in the output gap and increasing in the variance
of supply shocks.
However, in order to get the complete picture, we must add the indi-
rect effects and these indirect effects work against nominal bonds. Due to
the inflation risk premium that distinguishes nominal bonds from inflation-
linked bonds, the introduction of nominal bonds implies an increase in debt
service costs and thus higher taxes, lower structural output and higher infla-
tion. These indirect effects turn out to dominate the direct effects. Hence,
it is optimal not to issue any nominal bonds at all. This result holds true
irrespective the size of the output gap, the variance of supply shocks or the
degree of informedness of the central banker.
This result does change however, if we replace the assumption of dis-
cretionary policies with a form of commitment. Basically, in the case of
commitment, there is no inflation bias and the effect that nominal bonds
exert upon this inflation, directly and indirectly, disappears. This in itself
favors nominal bonds: in the case of commitment, it is optimal to have either
zero nominal bonds or zero inflation-linked bonds. This result also holds true
in a more general case, a case that nests the cases of discretion and commit-
ment. This underlines that inclusion of an inflation risk premium alone may
not be sufficient to find that inflation-linked bonds dominate nominal bonds:
there need to be a sufficiently large effect of the output gap upon average
inflation. Still, commitment, like discretion, cannot explain the observation
that ILB-issuing countries use both nominal and inflation-linked bonds as
financing tools.
This paper draws on a large literature on discretionary monetary policies
(Calvo, 1978; Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Barro and Gordon, 1983a; 1983b;
Rogoff, 1985; Alesina and Grilli, 1992; Walsh, 1995). The paper also relates
to a literature that focuses on the tax smoothing properties of different types
of debt (Barro, 2003; Bohn, 1990). Furthermore, the paper connects to a
literature that studies the interaction between the tax smoothing properties
of economic policies and their implications for the inflation bias of monetary
policies (Bohn, 1988; Calvo and Guidotti, 1990; 1993; Athey et al., 2005;
Martin, 2011).
There is a growing literature that compares the virtues of the two types of
bonds. Campbell and Viceira (2001) compare inflation-indexed bonds and
nominal bonds from the perspective of long-term, conservative investors.
They find that inflation-linked bonds are more attractive to investors and
that the associated welfare gains can be large. Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2008)
compares nominal debt with price-indexed debt in a cash-in-advance model.
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They find that if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals one,
indexed debt dominates nominal debt. If this elasticity differs from one,
nominal debt can outperform indexed debt, however. Alfaro and Kanczuk
(2010) adopt a quantitative calibrated model to assess the importance of the
inflation bias and the hedging gains that are connected with nominal bonds.
They find that the optimal amount of nominal debt is zero, both for the US
economy and that of Brazil, countries that have very different fractions of
inflation-linked debt. Hatcher (2014) compares the two types of debt under
two regimes for monetary policies, inflation targeting and price-level target-
ing. Under inflation targeting, indexed debt is dominant, whereas nominal
debt can outperform indexed debt under price-level targeting. However, ab-
stracting from indexation lags, indexed debt is superior also under price-level
targeting. Westerhout and Beetsma (2019) compare inflation-linked bonds
and nominal bonds under different fiscal regimes. They show that inflation-
linked bonds may stabilize fiscal indicators such as the public deficit and
public debt ratio, which may be worthwhile if there exist bounds for these
ratios, such as under the Stability and Growth Pact.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the central banker’s
model of discretionary monetary policies. Section 3 uses this model to elab-
orate its implications for the inflation risk premium and, related, the level
of structural output. Next, optimal debt policies are explored in section 4.
Section 5 considers two alternatives to the concept of discretionary monetary
policies. Finally, section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 A model of countercyclical monetary policies
We adopt a model in the spirit of the Barro-Gordon model of discretionary
monetary policies (Barro and Gordon, 1983a; 1983b; Rogoff, 1985; Alesina
and Grilli, 1992; Walsh, 1995). In this model, a central banker chooses the
rate of inflation such as to minimize a quadratic loss function which has two
arguments: consumption and inflation. This loss function represents the
preferences of consumers and it is this loss function that consumers try to
minimize when they choose their portfolio of nominal and inflation-linked
bonds. This portfolio behaviour will be discussed in the next section.
In choosing the rate of inflation, the central banker takes into account the
relation between consumption and surprise inflation. This relation is based
on three elements. First, the government in our model chooses the tax rate
on labour such as to equate tax revenues to debt service costs. Second, firms
are profit maximizers and base their labour demand on the prevailing tax
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rate on labour. Third, households spend what they earn. Hence, unexpected
inflation produces higher consumption: unexpected inflation induces the
government to lower the tax rate on labour income, induces firms to attract
more labour as wage costs decrease, and induces households to consume the
increase in output.
One might think that the model in this paper assumes cooperation be-
tween monetary and fiscal policymakers. This is not a good interpretation
of the model, however. The model does make an assumption on the fiscal
authority, namely that it pursues balanced budget policies by changing the
employer tax to absorb variations in debt service costs. This does not neces-
sarily imply cooperation, however. Its only assumption is that the monetary
policymaker, when deciding about optimal monetary policies, accounts for
the reaction by fiscal authorities to any surprise inflation it produces. Such
behaviour can reflect cooperation; it can also reflect rational decision-making
by a monetary policymaker in a world in which the fiscal authority lives ac-
cording to a well-specified rule.
The economy we study is small relative to the world economy. Both the
interest rate on inflation-linked bonds and the wage rate are determined on
world markets and thus exogenous. Note that the interest rate on nominal
bonds is endogenous, however, reflecting the inflation risk premium that
relates to among other things the amount of nominal bonds. The model
abstracts from any dynamic considerations: both the public debt and the
stock of household wealth are taken as given. This permits us to derive
analytical solutions.
Our model distinguishes households, firms, the government and the cen-
tral banker. We start the discussion with households.
2.1 Households
Consumption of households equals the sum of labour income, the profits of
firms and the returns on the bonds that households hold,
c = wl + π + s (1)
where w denotes the wage rate, l denotes employment, π denotes profits and
s denotes bond returns.
Profits of firms are defined as revenues minus costs, with the latter con-
sisting of wage costs plus a tax levied on the labour costs of firms,
π = y − (w + τ)l (2)
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where y stands for output and τ denotes the wage tax per unit of labour
employed.
Upon using t to refer to the revenues from taxing labour income, i.e. t ≡
τ l and combining equations (1) and (2), we derive the following expression
for consumption:
c = y − t+ s (3)
Bond returns consist of the returns on nominal bonds and those on inflation-
linked bonds. We will elaborate this below when we discuss the role of the
government.
Output is determined in the model of firms, which we will describe now.
2.2 Firms
The production of firms is described with a production function which has
decreasing returns to labour:
y = lη + µ 0 < η < 1 (4)
Here, µ denotes an error term, which we assume to be normally distributed
with zero mean and variance 0 < V ar(µ) <∞.2
In maximizing profits, the firm takes as given the price of labour. This
consists of the wage rate w, determined on the world market for labour,
and τ , the tax levied on the labour costs of firms. Profit maximization then








Inserting this expression into the production function gives us an expression
for output as a function of the tax rate on labour. For convenience, we
linearize this expression. For the same reason, we elaborate a linearized
expression for tax revenues as a function of the tax rate. Combining the
two, we can derive the following expression for output as a function of tax
revenues (see appendix A for the full derivation):
y = yn − εt+ µ (6)
2In order to avoid negative output, the distribution of µ must be bounded from below,
which a normal distribution is not. We abstract from this inconsistency, as it will be
irrelevant here in any practical sense.
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As we will see below, tax revenues relate to monetary policies. yn is exoge-
nous and can be interpreted as natural output.
Given this equation for output, we can rewrite the equation for consump-
tion, (3), as
c = yn − (1 + ε)t+ s+ µ (7)
The consumption equation can be further elaborated by invoking the gov-
ernment budget constraint. Hence, we now turn to the model of the gov-
ernment.
2.3 The government
Capital income, s, adds the real returns on nominal bonds to those on
inflation-linked bonds:
s = (iN − p̃)bN + rRbR (8)
As regards interest rates, we adopt i to refer to nominal rates and r to
refer to real rates. Subscript N denotes nominal bonds and subscript R
inflation-linked bonds. Hence, iN is the nominal rate of return on nominal
bonds and rR the real rate of return on inflation-linked bonds. The former
is endogenous, the second is exogenous (determined on the world capital
market). bN and bR denote the stocks of nominal and inflation-linked bonds,
which add up to the total public debt, b, which we assume strictly positive:
b ≡ bN + bR > 0. We assume both types of bonds are issued in non-negative
amounts: 0 ≤ bN , bR ≤ b.
We define the expected real rate of interest on nominal bonds as the
corresponding nominal interest rate minus the expected rate of inflation:
E(rN ) = iN − E(p̃) (9)
Combining equations (8) and (9), we can write capital income as a function
of three terms,
s = rRb+ PbN − (p̃− E(p̃)bN (10)
where P is defined as E(rN ) − rR, the inflation risk premium on nominal
bonds.
The first term on the RHS of equation (10) denotes the debt service
that would apply if all debt was financed with inflation-linked bonds. The
second term denotes the additional debt service that is due to the inflation
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risk premium. The last term on the RHS of equation (10) gives the change in
the (real) debt service on nominal bonds that is due to unexpected inflation,
p̃− E(p̃).
Tax revenues t follow from the government budget constraint which
equates those revenues to the debt service on nominal and inflation-linked
bonds:
t = s (11)
Combining this result with the equation for consumption, (7), we derive the
following version of the consumption equation:
c = y
′
n + εbN (p̃− E(p̃)) + µ (12)
with y
′
n defined as yn − ε(rRb+ PbN ).
y
′
n will be denoted as structural output, to distinguish it from natural
output, yn. The two concepts share that they are unrelated to counter-
cyclical monetary policies. They differ on account of public debt policies.
In particular, structural output is affected by public debt policies, whereas
natural output is unrelated to debt policies.
Equation (12) shares with the Lucas supply function (Lucas, 1973) and
the wage-contract version of the supply function (Rogoff, 1985) that surprise
inflation causes the economy to expand. According to the Lucas supply
function, surprise inflation induces firms to expand output as they interpret
nominal price changes as relative changes. According to the wage contract
theory, output expands as surprise inflation lowers real wages. In our model,
surprise inflation generates capital gains on nominal bonds which the govern-
ment uses to lower employer taxes and to which firms respond by expanding
employment and output. Note that the mechanism relies exclusively on
nominal bonds: with zero nominal bonds, surprise inflation has no output
effect.3
3The mechanism embedded in equation (12) is not the only way to model an effect
from surprise inflation upon consumption that gives a role to nominal debt. For example,
we could have included a labour income tax in our model, to be paid by employees,
assuming that the before-tax wage rate is determined on international markets. The
reduction in debt service costs that is due to surprise inflation would then bring about a
lower tax on labour income and an increase in labour supply and output, assumed that the
uncompensated labour supply elasticity is positive. In general, any government policy that
uses freed debt service costs to raise the supply of output could replace our mechanism.
Note that not all types of policies meet these conditions. Using freed debt service costs to
raise government spending on goods and services would not raise output. Higher public
spending would simply replace lower private spending, due to reduced capital income from
the holding of bonds.
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The relation between consumption and unexpected inflation in equation
(12) is taken into account by the central banker when choosing the rate of
inflation. To see what this implies for inflation, we will now describe the
behaviour of the central banker.
2.4 The central banker
The central banker chooses the inflation rate such as to minimize the fol-








This loss function is standard in the literature on discretionary monetary
policies. It assumes that households dislike inflation, p̃, for reasons that we
do not further specify. Similarly, the household dislikes consumption below
a certain target level, ĉ. Also standard is that we assume ĉ > E(c) or,
equivalently, ĉ > y
′
n (see equation (12)), reflecting some existing distortion
in the economy (Barro and Gordon, 1983a). As y
′
n is endogenous in our
model, we can at this point not be very precise about what ĉ > y
′
n implies.
We will come back to this below when we have obtained a reduced-form
expression for structural output.
The central banker now chooses that rate of price inflation that mini-
mizes the loss function (13), taking into account the relation between con-
sumption and unexpected inflation (12). She does so after a supply shock
has realized. The central banker is generally imperfectly informed about
this shock, however.
In particular, we assume that the central banker receives a signal, to be
denoted as µp, which equals the shock plus some measurement error variable:
µp ≡ µ + η. As regards η, we assume that it follows a normal distribution
with zero mean and variance 0 ≤ V ar(η) < ∞ and that it is uncorrelated
with the supply shock µ. Hence, the expectation of µ, conditional upon
observing the signal µp, equals θµp, where θ is the ratio of the variance of
the shock and the variance of the signal: θ ≡ V ar(µ)/(V ar(µ) + V ar(η))
(Walsh, 1995). Given our assumptions on V ar(µ) and V ar(η), θ is strictly
positive and equals one in the polar case of a perfectly informed central
banker.
The solution to the problem of the central banker implies the following
expressions for inflation and consumption:
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These expressions have a few standard properties.4 First, a higher output
gap, defined as ĉ−y′n, implies higher inflation, but does not affect consump-
tion (recall that ĉ > y
′
n). As long as the output target is public information,
it will be incorporated in inflationary expectations and consumption will
remain unaffected.
Second, supply shocks induce negative correlation between inflation and
consumption as monetary authorities use inflation to stabilize the economy.
Observation errors, on the contrary, imply positive correlation between con-
sumption and inflation. The reason is that in case of an error, output changes
only on account of the surprise inflation that the policymaker produces.
Equations (14) and (15) also indicate how imperfect information affects
the behaviour of the central banker. More noise in the signals that the
central banker receives about output shocks, i.e. a higher variance of ob-
servation errors V ar(η), implies a lower value for θ. As the central banker
reacts to the expected value of the supply shock, whch is given by θµp, more
noise makes the central banker less active. Hence, inflation becomes less
responsive to both output shocks and observation errors. This magnifies the
impact upon consumption of supply shocks and reduces that of observation
errors.
Importantly, nominal debt also affects the responsiveness of inflation to
an output shock. If we differentiate the coefficient of (µ + η) in equation
(14), θδεbN/(1 + δ(εbN )
2), with respect to bN , we find that the coefficient is
increasing in bN if 0 < bN < 1/(
√
δε) and decreasing in bN if bN > 1/(
√
δε).
This reflects that two forces work against each other. A higher amount of
nominal debt makes stabilization policies more effective. This induces the
central banker to make more use of the inflation instrument, but at the same
time makes it less necessary to use this instrument. For low levels of nominal
debt, the former argument dominates, for higher levels of nominal debt the
latter one.
The derived expressions for the rate of inflation and consumption, (14)
and (15), can be used to obtain the following expressions for their means,
their variances and their covariance:
E(p̃) = δεbN (ĉ− y
′
n) (16)
4Equations (14) and (15) generalize those derived in Alesina and Grilli (1992). They
are obtained if we add to their model a non-zero level of natural output and imperfect
information on the part of the central banker and further allow the coefficient of the
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(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
V ar(µ) (20)
Equations (18) to (20) are expressed in terms of θ and V ar(µ) rather than
V ar(µ) and V ar(η) (see appendix B for the derivation of these equations).
This allows to see clearly the role of θ, which measures the information
on part of the central banker. In particular, the less informed the central
banker (the lower is θ), the lower is the variance of inflation, the higher is
the variance of consumption and the less negative is the covariance between
consumption and inflation.
Importantly, this covariance is always non-positive (see equation (20)).
One might reason that a larger occurrence of observation errors (a higher
value for V ar(η)) would increase the weight of positively correlated changes
in consumption and inflation, turning the covariance positive. A larger oc-
currence of observation errors also makes the central banker less informed,
however, and less inclined to change the rate of inflation. The latter mecha-
nism reduces the covariance in an absolute sense and is sufficiently strong to
prevent the covariance from becoming positive. This feature also explains
that the assumption of imperfect information on part of the central banker
qualifies our results, but does not fundamentally change them.
One might argue that the non-positive nature of the covariance is overly
restrictive. This argument misses the question this paper wants to answer,
however. That is, can we explain the dominance of nominal bonds in the
real world from their attractive stabilization properties? If we constructed
the model such that observation errors would dominate supply shocks and
the covariance between consumption and inflation were positive, nominal
debt would destabilize the economy rather than stabilizing it.
Equations (16) to (20) also point to the role of nominal debt. In par-
ticular, equation (16) shows that nominal debt increases expected inflation.
This reflects the well-known inflation bias. Next, equation (19) can be used
to derive that consumption variability is a negative function of nominal
debt.5 The reason is that nominal debt flattens the Phillips curve, thereby
5Falcetti and Missale (2002) present some empirical evidence for the model prediction
that the variance of output is decreasing in the amount of nominal public debt.
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increasing the effectiveness of monetary stabilization policies.
These two factors suggest that the optimal amount of nominal debt will
reflect a trade-off between the inflation bias and consumption variability.
However, note that structural output enters equations (16) and (17). Be-
low, I will show that structural output relates to public debt policies. This
indicates it is too early at this stage to conclude something about the welfare
properties of nominal debt.
3 The inflation risk premium and structural out-
put
As indicated above, households in our model allocate a given amount of
financial wealth over two assets, namely nominal bonds and inflation-linked
bonds. How do they solve this allocation problem? Given that they must
choose their holdings of the two types of bonds before any shock has ma-












The relation between consumption and the household portfolio is described
by the consumption function (equation (7)), where we use equation (8) to
substitute for bond returns:
c = yn − (1 + ε)t+ (iN − p̃)bN + rRbR + µ (22)
The amount of nominal bonds that is optimal for the household then obeys
the first-order condition ∂E(L)/∂bN = 0, which can be written as an ex-
pression for the inflation risk premium:
P = −Cov(c, p̃)
(ĉ− y′n)
(23)
Equation (23) expresses that the inflation risk premium is proportional with
the covariance between consumption and inflation. In the previous section
we have derived that this covariance is non-positive (the covariance is zero
only if all debt is inflation-indexed (bN = 0)). Given the assumption ĉ > y
′
n,
equation (23) then indicates that the risk premium is non-negative (and zero
only if all debt is inflation-indexed). The interpretation of the inflation risk
premium is that of a compensation for inflation risk. Indeed, in case of a
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negative correlation between inflation and consumption, nominal bonds are
a bad hedge against consumption shocks and a premium is needed to make
households willing to hold them.
It is worthwhile to pause here a little and to ask whether the non-
negativeness of the inflation risk premium corresponds with findings in the
empirical literature. In general, we can say that empirical estimates of the
inflation risk premium vary a lot and are not always positive. In an overview
paper, Kupfer (2018) finds that, overall, the estimates of the inflation risk
premium are more positive than negative, however.6 Similarly, the esti-
mates in Bekaert et al. (2010) are, except one, all positive (and increasing
in the horizon). Furthermore, d’Amico et al. (2018), reviewing that part
of the literature that bases estimates of the inflation risk premium on the
covariance between inflation and the marginal utility of wealth, finds that
the estimated inflation risk premium is positive, ranging between 10 and 100
basis points.
In order to find a reduced-form expression for the inflation risk premium,
we now use the derived expression for the covariance between consumption
and inflation, equation (20), and the expression for structural output, y
′
n =
yn − ε(rRb + PbN ). This leads to the following quadratic equation for the
inflation risk premium:
(εbN )P
2 + (ĉ− yn + εrRb)P −
δεbN
(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
θV ar(µ) = 0 (24)
Before choosing which of the two candidate solutions applies, note that
x > 0, where x is a shortcut for ĉ − yn + εrRb, which is exogenous. x > 0
follows from writing x as ĉ − y′n − εPbN and noting that ĉ > y
′
n holds true
(by assumption) for any value of bN , including the zero value. For x > 0,












Equation (25) shows that, if bN > 0, the risk premium is increasing in the
variance of supply shocks, V ar(µ), decreasing in the variance of informa-
tion errors, V ar(η), and decreasing in the consumption target, ĉ. The risk
6Note that Kupfer (2018) finds that estimates of the inflation risk premium vary a
lot over time and that they are negative in some year in many analyses. This does not
seem related to correction for liquidity factors, suggesting therefore that shocks that imply
positive correlation between inflation and output do play a role.
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premium is also a function of the amount of nominal debt. In order to
learn about the shape of this function, it is more instructive to elaborate an
expression for debt service costs, rRb+ PbN .
Using the expression in equation (25), we can derive the following ex-
pression for debt service costs:














2θV ar(µ)δεbN (1− δ(εbN )2)





(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
θV ar(µ)
(27)
This expression makes clear that debt service costs are a hump-shaped func-
tion of nominal debt: increasing in nominal debt if 0 < bN < 1/(
√
δε) and
decreasing if bN > 1/(
√
δε). Note that we observed the same pattern before,
namely when discussing the expression for price inflation (equation (14)).
For low levels of nominal debt, more nominal debt implies more inflation
for a given output shock as nominal debt makes monetary policies more
effective. For high levels of nominal debt, the opposite holds true: more
nominal debt implies less inflation for a given output shock as less inflation
is needed to achieve output stabilization. It is easy to see that the two
are connected. Indeed, the hump-shaped pattern that we derived for infla-
tion also applies to the covariance between inflation and consumption, the
inflation risk premium and debt service costs.
Combining the reduced-form expression for debt service costs, equation
(26), with the expression for structural output, y
′
n = yn − ε(rRb + PbN ),









(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
V ar(µ) + x
]
(28)
Recall that, in setting up the model for the central banker, we assumed
that the target level of consumption exceeds structural output, i.e. ĉ > y
′
n.
We can now use the result that x > 0 to see what this assumption exactly
means. That is that ĉ > yn − εrRb.
Now that we have derived a reduced-form expression for structural out-
put, we can derive the optimal composition of the public debt. These optimal
debt policies follow from minimizing the social welfare loss function with bN
as instrument.
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4 Optimal debt policies
To find the optimal composition of the public debt, we adopt again the ex
ante value of the loss function (equation (21)). However, we rewrite it here
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δV ar(c) (29)
Inserting into equation (29) the expressions for the means and variances
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V ar(µ) (30)
This expression for the welfare loss of discretionary monetary policies re-
flects the trade-off between excessively high inflation and output stabiliza-
tion. The first term on the RHS of equation (30) reflects that discretionary
monetary policies produce too much inflation, thereby lowering social wel-
fare. The second term reflects that these policies stabilize the economy and
thus increase social welfare (without these policies, the second term at the
RHS of equation (30) would have read as 1/2δV ar(µ)).
The optimal amount of nominal debt is determined by direct and indirect
effects. Direct effects occur irrespective debt service costs. Indirect effects
occur through changes in debt service costs. Although the two can strictly
speaking not be separated, it is instructive to do so. We first focus on the
direct effects.
4.1 Direct effects
In order to exclude the indirect effects, we take y
′
n as exogenous in this
subsection. We can then, given this condition, write the derivative of the








(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
]
(31)
The first-order condition that gives us the optimal amount of nominal debt
can be written as ∂E(L)/∂bN = 0. In general, this first-order condition has
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three candidate solutions for bN . In each of the two cases we will consider,
two of the three can be ruled out, however.
The first case to consider is where (ĉ − y′n) ≥
√
θV ar(µ). In this case,
two of the three solutions are complex. The only real solution obeys the
second-order condition. This solution reads as follows,
b∗N = 0 (32)
where the asterisk is used to denote optimal debt policies.
In the second case to consider, (ĉ − y′n) <
√
θV ar(µ). In this case, all
three candidate solutions are real, but only one of them obeys the second-














We summarize these results in the form of two propositions.
Proposition 1a:
If the output gap is sufficiently large, i.e. (ĉ−y′n) ≥
√
θV ar(µ), the optimal
financing structure of the public debt features zero nominal debt.
Proposition 1b:
If the output gap is sufficiently small, i.e. (ĉ−y′n) <
√
θV ar(µ), the optimal
financing structure of the public debt features a strictly positive amount of
nominal debt, as specified in equation (33).
Figure 1 illustrates these propositions by adopting a high and low value for
the consumption target ĉ, namely 10.0 and 6.0 respectively.7 From proposi-
tions 1a and 1b, it is not immediately clear how high and how low ĉ should
be, as y
′
n is endogenous. The high value for ĉ obeys x ≥
√
θV ar(µ), which
appendix C shows is a sufficient condition for (ĉ− y′n) ≥
√
θV ar(µ). Simi-
larly, the low value for ĉ obeys x < 3/4
√
θV ar(µ), which the same appendix
shows is a sufficient condition for (ĉ− y′n) <
√
θV ar(µ).
The upper panel of figure 1 displays the two components of E(L) i.e.
the two terms at the RHS of equation (30), for ĉ = 10. The line ’output
gap’ refers to the first of these terms. The figure shows that the welfare
7The numerical calculations that are used to produce Figures 1 to 4 adopt the following
parameter values: δ=0.1, ε=0.5, yn=4.0, θ=1.0, V ar(µ)=10.0, rR=0.01, and b=10.0.
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loss due to the output gap is increasing in bN for all bN > 0. Similarly,
the line ’variability’ refers to the second of the two terms at the RHS of
equation (30). This stabilization term is decreasing in bN for all bN > 0:
more nominal debt reduces the welfare loss through its effect upon output
and price stability. The line ’total’ adds the two effects. It is increasing for
all bN > 0. Hence, in the case of a relatively high consumption target (ĉ
= 10), the amount of nominal debt that produces the lowest welfare loss is
zero, as stated in proposition 1a.
The lower panel of figure 1 does the same for a relatively low value for
the consumption target (ĉ = 6), so that the case in proposition 1b applies.
Compared with the upper panel, now the output gap argument has less
weight. Hence, the sum of the two effects (the line ’total’) is now decreasing
for low values of the nominal debt, flat at a value of 4.6 for bN and increasing
beyond. This indicates that the optimal amount of nominal debt is now
strictly positive, as reflected in proposition 1b.
These propositions can be understood as follows. Nominal bonds are
welfare-increasing as they reduce the impact of supply shocks, whereas they
are welfare-reducing as they increase both the impact of destabilizing in-
formation errors and the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policies.
If the former argument is insufficiently strong, i.e. the variance of supply
shocks is sufficiently small, then the introduction of an infinitesimally small
amount of nominal bonds is welfare-reducing. Then, proposition 1a applies:
the optimal amount of nominal debt is zero. On the other hand, if the
variance of supply shocks is sufficiently large, then the introduction of an
infinitesimally small amount of nominal bonds is welfare-increasing. Now,
proposition 1b applies. Increasing the share of nominal bonds further re-
duces their net welfare gain as the loss due to the inflation bias increases
faster than the other two factors (as can be seen from inspecting equation
(31)). It is then optimal to increase the nominal debt up to the point as
indicated in equation (33), where the net welfare gain of a further increase in
the nominal debt is zero or the stock of nominal debt hits its upper bound.8
Although intuitive, the results are inconsistent with the model itself, as
they treat structural output as exogenous, whereas it is endogenous. There-
fore, we now add indirect effects and see what that implies for the results.
8The result that is reflected in propositions 1a and 1b are close to those in Calvo and
Guidotti (1990). They also find that the optimal amount of nominal debt is increasing in
the variance of shocks and decreasing in the inflation bias, but only after some threshold
point has been crossed.
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Figure 1: Welfare loss: direct effects
 




































4.2 Direct and indirect effects
Different from the previous subsection, we now differentiate E(L) in equation
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The first line at the RHS of equation (34) recalls the direct effects in equation
(31); the second line represents the indirect effects. There are two kinds of
indirect effects. The first is that an increase in nominal debt changes debt
service costs and, through a change of taxation, the levels of structural
output and average consumption. Secondly, through changing structural
output, the increase in nominal debt changes the output gap which is the
source of the inflation bias. The term on the last line of equation (34) takes
the two indirect effects together, since they are proportional with each other.
One can see immediately from equation (34) that bN = 0 obeys the first-
order condition. Appendix D elaborates the second derivative of E(L) with
respect to bN and derives that at the point bN = 0 this derivative equals
(δε)2(x2 + θV ar(µ)), which is strictly positive. Furthermore, appendix D
derives that dE(L)/dbN > 0 for all bN > 0. Hence, the optimal financing
structure of public debt consists of price-indexed debt only,
b∗N = 0 (35)
We state this result in proposition 2.
Proposition 2:
If we account for the endogeneity of structural output, the optimal financing
structure of the public debt features zero nominal debt.
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In order to explain this result, it must be the case that the indirect ef-
fects imply a welfare loss for small positive values of bN , as proposition 2
holds irrespective the sign of (ĉ− y′n)−
√
θV ar(µ). This can be easily veri-
fied. The two indirect effects turn out to be proportional with the derivative
of debt service costs with respect to the stock of nominal debt (see equation
(27)). This derivative is positive for small positive values of bN , as discussed
above.










































Note that we have split dE(L)/dy
′
n in equation (34) into two terms in order
to show that there are two indirect effects, one that runs through average
inflation and another that runs through average consumption (structural
output). Because they are proportional to each other, they show up as one
term in expression (34).
Above, we have shown that the derivative of debt service costs with
respect to the stock of nominal debt, d(rRb+PbN )/dbN , is negative for large
values of nominal debt, bN > 1/(
√
δε). This does not imply that the total
welfare effect changes sign, however. We recall our finding in the discussion
of direct effects that the welfare gain from better stabilization properties
becomes smaller, the higher becomes the amount of nominal debt.
Figure 2 illustrates. The upper panel assumes ĉ = 10 and is closely
connected to the upper panel of figure 1. Indeed, the line ’variability’ which
refers to a direct effect, is the same in the two panels. The lines ’output gap’
and ’total’ in figure 2 look very similar to the corresponding lines in figure
1. Actually, they increase somewhat more than in figure 1. This does not
change the conclusion we might have drawn from figure 1: for a sufficiently
high value for ĉ, the optimal stock of nominal debt equals zero. Accounting
for indirect effects does not change this conclusion.
More interesting is the case of ĉ = 6, as reflected in the lower panel of
figure 2. Again, the line ’variability’ mimics the corresponding line in figure
1, whereas the line ’output gap’ in figure 2 increases a little more over the
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range ((0, b) than in figure 1. This subtle difference is enough to change the
nature of the line ’total’ however. In figure 2, more nominal debt produces
a higher welfare loss if we account for indirect effects, refelcting our result
in proposition 2.
One may wonder why it is that the welfare gains from better stabiliza-
tion properties play a subordinate role. Indeed, one could argue that if the
variance of supply shocks is sufficiently large, nominal bonds should out-
perform indexed bonds. The reason that this is not the case is that a high
variance of supply shocks produces also a high covariance between output
and inflation and thus a high risk premium on nominal bonds. A large vari-
ance of supply shocks does not only raise the marginal welfare gain from
better stabilization policies, it also increases the marginal welfare loss from
higher debt service costs.
A similar argument holds true for the variance of information errors.
One could argue that a sufficiently low variance of information errors would
boost the gains from better stabilization policies and would make a marginal
increase in nominal debt welfare-increasing. This is not so, even if V ar(η)
takes its minimum value of zero. The reason is, again, that a low variance
of information errors corresponds to a high output-inflation covariance and
thus a huge risk premium.
Reducing the target rate for consumption cannot reverse the sign of the
marginal welfare effect either. Although this reduces the welfare costs of
nominal bonds that relate to the inflation bias, it also increases the inflation
risk premium and thus the welfare costs associated with higher debt service
costs.
5 The role of discretion
Until now, we have assumed that monetary policies are discretionary in
nature. In other words, the central banker in our model lacks the technology
to commit himself to optimal policies and to not give in to the temptation
to produce surprise inflation after expectations by the public have been
formed (and have affected nominal interest rates). Many adhere to the
concept of discretionary policies, probably because these policies are time-
consistent and there is empirical evidence supporting the concept.9 It cannot
be denied that the concept is debatable, however. Indeed, one can think of
many reasons why a central banker would want to preserve the reputation
9For the US, Ireland (1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003) present empirical evidence for an
inflation bias, whereas Surico (2008) finds that this bias has disappeared over time.
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Figure 2: Welfare loss: total effects
 
































of a dependable policymaker (Barro and Gordon, 1983b).
In this section, we will therefore explore two alternatives. One is that
of commited monetary policies, i.e. policies of a central banker who does
not give in to the temptation to inflate in order to reduce the output gap.
Like the discretionary central banker, the committed central banker does
use inflation to stablilize the economy, however. In a sense, committed
monetary policies can then be said to be optimal (Alesina and Grilli, 1992):
they stabilize the economy without producing unnecessarily high inflation
as is the case with discretionary monetary policies.
The second alternative concept is that of monetary policies under im-
perfect credibility. As that concept builds upon the concept of commitment,
we start with the concept of commitment.
5.1 The case of monetary policies under commitment
In the case of commitment, the central banker has access to a commitment
technology. Hence, the banker does not give in to the temptation to pro-
duce inflation, although that would be optimal after expectations have been
formed. On the other hand, the central banker will use the inflation in-
strument in order to smooth negative or positive changes in output, just as
he does in the discretionary case. Similarly, like before, the central banker
cannot observe output shocks precisely and has to act on the basis of an
output signal only.10 Taking things together, this means that the equation
for price inflation differs only in one respect from the one we derived for the




1 + δ(εbN )2
)
θ(µ+ η) (37)
The equation of consumption is identical to the one we derived for the case
of discretion (equation (17)).
10This interpretation of commitment follows that in Alesina and Grilli (1992). Note
that it is different from the case of rules (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon,
1983b; Athey et al., 2005), in which case policies are unresponsive to output shocks. For
the purpose of this paper, the case of rules is not very interesting. Nominal debt would not
play any role as it would not affect output variability, expected inflation or the inflation
risk premium.
11Similar to the case of discretionary policies, equation (37) generalizes the equation in
Alesina and Grilli (1992). Their equation is obtained if we add to their model imperfect
information on the part of the central banker and further allow the coefficient of the
Phillips curve to deviate from one.
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The joint inflation-consumption distribution changes also in only one
respect: expected inflation. Obviously, expected inflation is zero in the case
of commitment:
E(p̃) = 0 (38)
Expected consumption, the variance of inflation, the variance of consump-
tion and the covariance between inflation and consumption do not change;
the expressions for these variables are identical to their counterparts in the
case of discretion (equations (17) to (20)).
Compared to the case of discretion, the welfare analysis simplifies, as the
term that relates to the inflation bias drops out. Different from the case of
discretion, nominal debt does not lower welfare by fueling the inflation bias
directly and indirectly through structural output in the case of commitment.
This can be seen in the following expressions for the social welfare loss and
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Looking at the derivative in equation (40), we see that, like in the case of
discretion, bN = 0 solves the first-order condition dE(L)/dbN = 0. Further-
more, appendix E derives that at bN = 0, d
2E(L)/(dbN )
2 = (δε)2θV ar(µ) >
0. bN = 0 thus represents a local optimum. However, the expression for the
derivative in the case of commitment differs fundamentally from its coun-
terpart in the case of discretion. Appendix E show that dE(L)/dbN turns
negative beyond a threshold value for bN . This implies that bN = 0 does
not need to a global optimum; the optimum is either bN = 0 or bN = b.
12
Appendix E elaborates expressions for E(L) when bN = 0 and when
bN = b and uses these to derive that there is a critical value for b, to be
12This result is reminiscent of the result that Calvo and Guidotti (1990) derive for the
case of commitment: finance all the public debt with nominal bonds.
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denoted b̃, that defines which of the two solutions applies: if b < b̃, bN = 0
is optimal and if b > b̃, bN = b is optimal. In the borderline case b = b̃,
an indifference result emerges: the options of financing the public debt fully
with nominal bonds or fully with price-indexed bonds yield identical levels
of social welfare.
We state the result on the optimal debt structure in proposition 3.
Proposition 3:
In case monetary policies are conducted under commitment, the optimal
financing structure of the public debt features either zero nominal debt or
zero inflation-linked debt.
Figure 3 illustrates proposition 3 for the same parameter configurations as
used before. The lines labelled ’variability’ in the two panels correspond
to their counterparts in figures 1 and 2. The lines labelled ’output gap’
are different, however. In figure 3, they are decreasing beyond a critical
value for bN . This explains that the lines labelled ’total’ in the two panels
are hump-shaped. In both cases, bN = b implies a lower welfare loss than
bN = 0. The contrast with the case of discretion cannot be more clear.
5.2 A more general case of monetary policies
Given the difference in results for the case of discretion and commitment,
it is interesting to study also a more general case that encompasses these
two cases. We adopt an approach based on Cukierman and Liviatan (1991).
They develop a model for a non-stochastic world based on two assumptions.
One is that the policymaker can be weak (W) or strong (S). A weak poli-
cymaker is a policymaker who is unable to commit to its earlier announce-
ment; a strong policymaker always sticks to his earlier announcement. The
probability that the policymaker is strong (weak) is α (1 − α). The other
assumption is that the public is imperfectly informed about the type of pol-
icymaker; only the probabilities α and 1 − α are known. Cukierman and
Liviatan derive that it is optimal for the strong policymaker not to announce
a zero rate of inflation, but a rate of inflation equal to (1− α)p̃D, where p̃D
is the rate of inflation chosen by the weak policymaker. The reason is that
the public accounts for the possibility that the policymaker in office is weak
and will produce the discretionary rate of inflation. This raises their in-
flation expectations (compared to the perfect information case), which in
turn induces the strong policymaker to announce (and produce) the rate of
inflation (1− α)p̃D.
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Figure 3: Welfare loss: the case of commitment
 

































We use these results to distinguish between a strong and weak policy-
maker who differ in their responsiveness to the output gap. Similar to the
case of commitment studied above, we assume the strong and weak poli-
cymaker to respond in an identical way to (imperfectly observed) output
shocks.
This then yields that the rate of price inflation chosen by the weak
policymaker mimics the rate elaborated above for the case of discretion
(equation (14)):
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θ(µ+ η) (41)
The strong policymaker produces the following rate of price inflation:





1 + δ(εbN )2
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θ(µ+ η) (42)
Note that this rate of price inflation is always (1 − α)δεbN (ĉ − y
′
n) higher
than in case of commitment (equation (37)).
The expected rate of inflation averages the rates of inflation chosen by
the two types of policymakers:
E(p̃) = (1− α)p̃W + αp̃S = (1− α2)δεbN (ĉ− y
′
n) (43)
Expected consumption can be derived to be identical to the expression that
applies in the cases of discretion and commitment. The same holds true for
the variances of inflation and consumption and their covariance. The case
studied in this subsection thus generalizes the two earlier cases and includes
them as special cases: if α = 0, we are back in the world of discretionary
policies (equation (16)); if α = 1, the commitment case applies (equation
(37)).
The expression for social welfare also generalizes the two earlier expres-
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The same holds true for the expression for dE(L)/dbN :
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The last line of this equation shows that the derivative dE(L)/dbN in the
general case can be written as a weighted average of the corresponding ex-
pressions for the case of discretion and commitment (dE(L)/dbN |D refers to
the case of discretion, equation (34), and dE(L)/dbN |C refers to the case of
commitment, equation (40)).
Simulations will then reflect the case of either discretion or commitment.
If we take α sufficiently low, the general case will be close to the case of
discretion and the optimum amount of nominal bonds will be zero. If, on
the other hand, we take α sufficiently close to one and b sufficiently large,
the optimal debt structure will involve zero inflation-linked bonds.
Figure 4 illustrates, again using the same parameter configurations as
used before and assuming α = 0.5. In both panels, the case of discretion
dominates that of commitment. Hence, in both panels the optimal amount
of nominal debt equals zero. Actually, it takes a quite highe value for α
to overturn this result. Simulations (not shown for brevity) show that only
if the probability that the central banker is a strong policymaker is higher
than 75 percent (if ĉ = 6.0) or higher than 90 percent (when ĉ = 10.0), it is
optimal to finance the public debt entirely with nominal bonds.
6 Conclusions
Let us go back now to where we started. That is the question why govern-
ments across the world use mainly nominal bonds to finance their public
debts? Constructing a model of discretionary monetary policies and fo-
cussing on the direct welfare effects, it seems that we find an answer to that
30
Figure 4: Welfare loss: the more general case
 





































question. Nominal debt makes monetary policies that are aimed at the sta-
bilization of the economy more effective. This even holds true when output
shocks are only imperfectly observed by the central banker. But this anal-
ysis that focuses on direct effects only also shows that this result does not
generally hold true. If the output gap is sufficiently large or the variance
of output shocks sufficiently small, issuing only a small amount of nominal
bonds will be welfare-reducing and it is better not to use nominal bonds at
all.
More importantly, these results cannot be more than illustrative how-
ever, as they are based on an inconsistent approach. To make the approach
consistent, we have to account for indirect effects as well. Doing so destroys
the results achieved before. Now, the optimal amount of nominal bonds
turns out to be zero, irrespective the values of output gap and variance of
output shocks. Intuitively, if nominal debt makes monetary policies more ef-
fective in stabilizing the economy, this show up in an inflation risk premium,
which makes it more costly to use nominal bonds to finance the public debt.
One way to get rid of these results is to assume that monetary poli-
cymakers can commit themselves to optimal policies, i.e. to assume that
policymakers are able not to give in to the temptation to inflate once price
expectations (and nominal interest rates) have been set. The assumption of
commitment removes the inflation bias from the model and lowers the wel-
fare cost of the inflation risk premium. Assuming commitment, the optimal
fraction of the public debt that should be financed with nominal bonds is
now 0 or 100 percent. Which of the two policies is optimal, depends again
on the value of output gap and variance of output shocks. However, the as-
sumption of commitment does not explain either why governments mainly
use nominal bonds to finance part of their debts.
Finally, we adopt a more general approach that encompasses the cases
of discretion and commitment. Giving equal weights to the two cases, the
welfare losses of the nominal bonds under discretion turn out to dominate
the gains under commitment and the optimal amount of nominal bonds is
zero. Only if the case of commitment is given very large weight, does the
opposite result (use only nominal bonds to finance the public debt) emerge.
Overall, our analysis indicates that generally price-index bonds dominate
nominal bonds in welfare terms. Returning to the question in the introduc-
tion of this paper, our analysis does not give an answer to it. The dominance
of nominal bonds must then be attributed to other factors. These may in-
clude the liquidity argument or the existence of nominal contracts (see the
introduction of this paper). Another argument is that too much indexation
may lead people to fear an increase of inflation. Indeed, Fischer and Sum-
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mers (1989) and Ball and Cecchetti (1991) argue that indexation reduce
the costs of inflation and may thereby give rise to higher inflation. Further
research is clearly warranted to answer the unresolved puzzle.
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Appendices
A Linearizing the output equation
In the main text, we have stated the production function and the demand
for labour that can be derived from it. For convenience, we repeat them
here:








Upon substituting equation (A.2) into equation (A.1), we derive an equation








Linearizing the first term at the RHS of equation (A.3) around τ = 0, µ = 0
gives the following equation for output,






0 τ + µ (A.4)
where y0 is defined as (w/η)
(η/(η−1)).
In a similar way, we linearize the equation for tax revenues, t ≡ τ l, in
terms of the tax rate,
t = l0(1 + σl)τ (A.5)
where l0 = (w/η)
(1/(η−1)).
σl is the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the tax rate, i.e.
σl ≡ (dl/dτ)(τ/l), evaluated in τ = 0, µ = 0. σl < 0, given our concave
production function. We assume in addition that σl > −1 in order to ensure
that tax revenues are increasing in the tax rate.
Combining equations (A.4) and (A.5) yields an equation for output that
is linear in tax revenues,
y = yn − εt+ µ (A.6)
where ε is a shortcut for 1/((1−η)(1+σl)) and yn represents y0. As 0 < η < 1
and −1 < σl < 0, ε > 0.
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B Deriving expressions for the variances of infla-
tion and consumption and their covariance
Recall the expressions for inflation and consumption from the main text
(equations (14) and (15)):












1 + (1− θ)δ(εbN )2






1 + δ(εbN )2
)
η (B.2)
Use the equation for inflation to find an expression for the variance of in-
flation (recall that µ and η are uncorrelated). This gives the first line in
equation (B.3). Elaboration yields the last line of equation (B.3), which is
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)2 (V ar(µ))2




1 + δ(εbN )2
)2
θV ar(µ)
Following the same procedure gives equations (19) and (20) in the main text.
V ar(c) =
(
1 + (1− θ)δ(εbN )2












1 + 2(1− θ)δ(εbN )2







1 + δ(εbN )2
)2
((1− θ)2V ar(µ) + θ2V ar(η))
=
(
1 + 2(1− θ)δ(εbN )2 + (1− θ)δ2(εbN )4
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(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
(−(1− θ)V ar(µ) + θV ar(η))
=
−θδ(εbN )
(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
V ar(µ)
C When do propositions 1a and 1b apply?




Using the definitions for y
′
n ≡ yn − ε(rRb+ PbN ) and x ≡ ĉ− yn + εrRb, we




Using the structural equation for P , equation (25), we rewrite the inequality













Defining z as x/
√









(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
≥ 1 (C.4)
For the term δ(εbN )
2/(1 + δ(εbN )
2)2, we calculate the following derivative





(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
)
/dbN =
2δε2bN (1− δ(εbN )2)
(1 + δ(εbN )2)3
(C.5)
From this expression, we derive that the derivative term d(δ(εbN )
2/(1 +
δ(εbN )
2)2)/dbN is positive if 0 < bN < 1/(
√




negative if bN > 1/(
√
δε). Hence, we conclude from this that the term
δ(εbN )
2/(1 + δ(εbN )
2)2 has a minimum of zero (for bN=0) and a maximum
of 1/4 (for bN = 1/(
√
δε)).
In terms of equation (C.4), we derive an inequality condition for z if
δ(εbN )
2/(1 + δ(εbN )







z2 ≥ 1 z ≥ 1 (C.6)
Similarly, we derive an inequality condition if δ(εbN )









z2 + 1 ≥ 1 z ≥ 3/4 (C.7)
Recalling that z ≡ x/
√
θV ar(µ) , we derive that x ≥
√
θV ar(µ) is a suf-
ficient condition for (ĉ − y′n) ≥
√
θV ar(µ) and x < 3/4
√
θV ar(µ) is a
sufficient condition for (ĉ− y′n) <
√
θV ar(µ).
D Proof of proposition 2
This appendix proves proposition 2 in the main text.
We start to write down the first-order condition for optimal nominal











2(1− δ(εbN )2)(δε)2bNθV ar(µ)(ĉ− y
′
n)
(1 + δ(εbN )2)2D
= 0
One easily derives from this expression that bN = 0 solves this first-order
condition. In order to find whether this solution represents a mimimum
or maximum, we elaborate the second-order derivative d2E(L)/(dbN )
2 and




2(x2 + θV ar(µ)) > 0 (D.2)
This indicates the solution bN = 0 reflects a local minimum.
In order to find out whether equation (D.1) has more solutions, we eval-
uate dE(L)/dbN for bN > 0. Before doing that however, we rewrite equation
(D.1) in a more convenient form. Using the definition of D as given in the
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main text, we rewrite y
′
n as ĉ− 1/2(D + x) and thus ĉ− y
′
n as 1/2(D + x).






(D + x)2 (D.3)
− (δε)
2bNθV ar(µ)
(1 + δ(εbN )2)2
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In order to evaluate dE(L)/dbN for any x > 0, we proceed in two steps.
First, we evaluate dE(L)/dbN in case x = 0. This yields dE(L)/dbN |x=0 = 0
(use that in case x = 0, D2 reads as 4θδ(εbN )
2V ar(µ)/(1 + δ(εbN )
2)2).
Second, we differentiate dE(L)/dbN with respect to x. This yields the fol-
lowing expression (use that dD/dx = x/D and that (D2−x2)/(4δ(εbN )2) =




















We derive that for all x ≥ 0, d2E(L)/(dbNdx) = 0 if bN = 0. This does
not follow immediately from evaluating d2E(L)/(dbNdx), as this gives an
indeterminate outcome for bN = 0. Applying the rule of l’Hôpital, we derive
limbN→0 d
2E(L)/(dbNdx) by elaborating limbN→0 f
′(bN )/(limbN→0 g
′(bN )),
where f(bN ) = (1− x/D)2 and g(bN ) = 4δε2bN .
Next, we derive that for all x ≥ 0, d2E(L)/(dbNdx) > 0 if bN > 0.
Combining the results from these two steps, we derive that for all x > 0,
dE(L)/(dbN ) = 0 if bN = 0 and dE(L)/(dbN ) > 0 if bN > 0. Hence, bN = 0
is the only solution to the first-order condition (D.1) for any x > 0.
E Proof of proposition 3
In order to find the optimal debt financing structure in the case of commit-
















This expression clearly shows that bN = 0 solves the first-order condition.
Furthermore, we can use it to derive that at bN = 0 d
2E(L)/(dbN )
2 =
(δε)2θV ar(µ) > 0.
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Define H(bN ) as the term between right brackets in equation (E.1):
H(bN ) = −1 +
(
1− δ(εbN )2
















2bNθV ar(µ)(1− δ(εbN )2)2
D3(1 + δ(εbN )2)4
which is negative for all bN > 0. Noting that H(0) = 1 and H(1/(
√
δε)) =
−1, it must be that the H function switches sign (from positive to negative)
at a threshold value, say b̂N , for which 0 < b̂N < 1/(
√
δε). Given that the
H function is negative for some values of bN , the optimal value of nominal
debt is either zero or b.
To see whether bN = 0 or bN = b corresponds with a lower welfare
loss, we elaborate E(L) as specified in equation (39) for these two candidate






























We can now derive that the sign of (E(L)|bN=0−E(L)|bN=b) equals the sign
of b(x2(−1 + δ(εb)2) + δ3(εb)6θV ar(µ)/(1 + δ(εb)2)2). Define this expression










Note that J < 0 for sufficiently small, but positive values of b. Since ∂J/∂b >
0, J > 0 for values of b > b̃, where b̃ is the value for b that solves J = 0.
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